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THE MATRIX OF THE COMMON LAW*
GEORGE L. HASKINS**
Great men have admonished us never to forget the continuing relevance
of history in the Anglo-American legal system. Holmes wrote that the
"rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history" because
without it we cannot know the scope of the original rules.' Cardozo warned
that in many areas "there can be no progress without history,"2 that the
law of real estate is incomprehensible without history.3 Maitland wrote
that we have survived the ancient writs, the old forms of action, but they
still rule us from their graves.4 Dean Pound has reminded us of the value
of history in identifying traditional elements in our law to which judges
customarily have recourse in defining premises and finding analogies
from precedents in order to deal with new problems.5 We are cautioned
to remember that the highly individualistic character of much of our law
is explained by its Germanic rather than its Roman roots and, further,
that the Anglo-American system has built upon countervailing concepts
of relationships which are feudal in origin, and to which rights and duties
attach without regard to the will of individuals, which is the underlying
principle of classical Roman law, the only other elaborate and mature
system in western jurisprudence. Thus, in our law, powers, rights, and
duties stem from relationships such as principal-agent, vendor-purchaser,
landlord-tenant and the like.6
This article is concerned with history, but less from the standpoint of
narrative than to illustrate the sources and functions of one of the most
powerful of Anglo-American legal institutions, the common law. It is one
of the major legal systems of the world, and it is the oldest body of law
common to a whole kingdom and administered by central courts with a
nation-wide competence. Its traditions and its principles have afforded
refuge from greed, incompetence, hatred, violence, and the tyranny of
special interests. Its great political importance is apparent in the survival
of its principles in the face of formidable efforts to supersede or overthrow
* This article is an expanded version of a lecture delivered before members of
the Cleveland Bar Association on April 29, 1991, and is part of a longer essay on
the development of the common law from the 12th to the 17th century.
** Joseph C. Hostetler-Baker & Hostetler Visiting Professor of Law, Cleve-
land-Marshall College of Law; Algernon Sydney Biddle Professor Emeritus, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 O.W. Holmes, Jr., 10 HARv. L. REv 457, 469 (1896-97).
2 B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 54 (1921).
1 Id. at 54-56.
4 F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (1958) [hereinafter
F.W. MAITLAND, FORMS OF ACTION].
5 R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 20-24 (1921).
6Id.
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them, and those principles often seem to have become more firmly settled
after each crisis. Its qualities of vitality and tenacity are part of its tra-
dition, and its conveniences have been almost countless.
The term "common law" has had several meanings, changing from time
to time in various periods of its long history. Yet it has had an identifiable
hard core of permanence since at least the 13th century. At that time, a
large body of law was becoming "common" and was being differentiated
from its rivals, in the ecclesiastical courts, in the feudal courts of local
lords, in the courts of the county and the hundred, and in the courts of
the manor and borough. Three centuries later, St. Germain, author of
Doctor and Student in 1523, could define the common law as the law of
the king's central courts of justice, as distinguished from "baser" courts,
such as feudal, manorial, and local courts.7 Lord Coke, in his exchange
with King James I, on that memorable Sunday morning of November
1612, emphasized the constitutional aspect of the common law when he
stated that it was the essence of the rules protecting individual life and
property which were to be determined by the regular central courts of
common law and not by the king in person or by appointees in his newly
created prerogative courts.8
Sir William Blackstone's analysis, at the end of the 18th century, had
changed little from St. Germain's when he identified common law as "that
law, by which proceedings and determinations in the king's ordinary
courts of justice are guided and directed."9 Indeed it differs little from
that of F. H. Lawson in a recent book in which he describes the common
law as the decision of the central courts at Westminster.l0 Although Black-
stone had a great influence on American law after the Revolution, there
were divergencies of opinion as to what was meant by the common law
and to what extent it could serve as precedents for decisions in this
country. Opinions varied from the full acceptance of English decisions as
of a set date, and not inconsistent with local conditions,1 to generaliza-
tions such as that of Chancellor Kent of New York, that the common law
"includes those principles, usages, and rules of action applicable to the
government and security of person and property ... .-"12
Misapprehensions about the term "common law" in America were clar-
ified by Justice Holmes in a dissenting opinion in the Black and White
Taxi Co. case,13 concurred in by Justices Brandeis and Stone, where it is
stated:
7 91 SELDEN SOCIETY, ST. GERMAN'S DOCTOR AND STUDENT 47 (T. Plucknett &
J. Barton eds. 1974).8 Summarized by POUND, supra note 5, at 60-61. The interview is reported in
Prohibitions Del Roy, 12 Co. Rep. 63, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (K.B. 1610).
9 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 68 (1765).
10 See F.H. LAWSON & B. RUDDEN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 8 (2d ed. 1982).
' United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 393-95 (1798).
12 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 536 (*469) (O.W. Holmes 12th ed. 1873); cf. Norway
Plains Co. v. Boston and Maine R.R., 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 263, 266 (1854).
13 Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
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Books written about ... the common law treat it as a unit....
[as if] there were ... a transcendental body of law outside of
any particular State .... But there is no such body of law....
The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether
called common law or not, is not the common law generally
[i.e. the law as expressed in decisions of the English courts]
but the law of that State. ... It may be adopted by statute .
... It may be changed by statute. .. . It may be departed from
deliberately by judicial decisions. ..."14
Thus, each State has developed its own "common law," partly on the
basis of reception of some part of English common law decisions but, more
important, on the basis of a State's own traditions and precedent."6 For
example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has recently made clear
that the common law of that State is the accretion of and the adherence
to rules and procedures identifiable in long lines of decisions reaching
back to Massachusetts in the colonial and provincial periods of that Com-
monwealth, and developed by the Maine Court in its years of statehood. 16
If the common law of Ohio is not that of New York, neither is New York
law that of Illinois, but there are nevertheless common grounds, based
on English law, among the States. Thus, there is a general understanding
in nearly all States as to what constitute the elements of a tort, a contract,
or an estate in land "at common law".
Fully as important to American law as the traditional elements of the
English common law is the mode of juristic thinking inherited from the
process of English decision-making which we call the doctrine of prece-
dent. The English tradition to which we have adhered is for judges to
move empirically from case to case, from one reality to another, and the
concept has become a chief characteristic of the common law down to
modern times.
With these two traditions in mind, special interest attaches to the
beginnings of the common law. Those beginnings are to be found in his-
tory, partly in the needs and demands of successive groups and classes
in society, partly in the ethical and moral ideals of particular eras. More
pragmatically, however, its beginnings are to be found in two vital factors
of a bygone age: the greed and ambitions of the early Norman and Plan-
taganet kings, and the convenience of the legal remedies that they made
available to their subjects. Recently, a few scholars, notably S. F. C.
Milsom, 7 have taken the position that the great changes and reforms of
"Id. at 533-34 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
"1 See generally Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV.
L. REv. 6 (1910-11).
16 Bell v. Town of Wells, 575 A.2d 168, 171-73 (Me. 1989).
17 See generally S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW,
chs. 1, 2 (2d ed. 1981), and J. Hudson, Wilson's Legal Structure, 59 TIJDSCHRIFT
VOOR RECHTSGESCHIZDENIS 47 (1991).
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those first kings came about in the interest of strengthening the efficiency
and functioning of the feudal system. That view, which is contrary to the
expositions of scholars such as Maitland,8 C. H. Haskins,19 and Julius
Goebel, 2° has won few adherents, particularly in light of the careful anal-yses of Richardson and Saylesil and the brilliant work of Van Caenegem 21
- all of whom, in one degree or another, have stressed the self-aggran-
dizing exploitations of the Norman and Plantagenet kings. Having im-ported Norman feudalism into England for purposes of effectuating their
conquest, they soon began to transform it in order to centralize govern-
mental power for their own benefit, and ultimately - within approxi-
mately 200 years - practically to destroy it.
To understand how the English common law began, how it was shaped
and developed, one must go back some 900 years to the Norman Conquest
in 1066. The Normans were a shrewd, dominating, ruthless, acquisitive
and resourceful race. Above all, they were efficient organizers who
brought with them to England few institutions of their own, but utilized
to the full existing Anglo-Saxon institutions, reshaping them for their
own benefit but seldom abolishing them. The first Norman kings, and
their Plantagenet successors, were bent on restructuring, elaborating and
refining the chief features of continental feudalism which they brought
with them. Under them, from the l1th to the late 12th centuries, English
feudalism became both a political arrangement and a system of govern-
ment, backed by a standing military army of occupation. It became a
system of law interwoven with a scheme of land ownership and tenure.
In addition, it developed into a system of economy and a structure of class
status based upon the kinds and types of tenure by which men held land
of other persons in return for stipulated services. 23
In principle, all land was held of the king, who was at the apex of a
theoretical pyramid. Thus, A, a tenant-in-chief, held of the king, who washis lord; but B, a subtenant, held of A who was B's lord. The tenant owed
a service to his lord: it might be military (knight-service), it might be
agricultural, or even consist of a money payment (free socage). It might
be in frankalmoign lands held in free alms in return for prayers recited
for the souls of the dead. Nearly every piece of land was usually held by
several persons and often by different sorts of tenures, even though only
one tenant would have actual possession. Thus, a chief lord might hold
all his land by the service of providing one knight to the king's army,
but most of it would be held of that lord by several subtenants or sub-
, F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 23-39 (1963)
[hereinafter F.W. MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY].19 C.H. HASKINS, NORMAN INSTITUTIONS (1918).
20 J. GOEBEL, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL IN-
STITUTIONS (1946).21 H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYLES, THE GOVERNANCE OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND
(1963).22 R. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW (1973).
23 F.W. MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 18, at 24-26, 30-32.
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subtenants in agricultural or socage tenure. Then, further down the social
scale, was a supporting manorial organization consisting of the large but
anonymous mass of nonfreemen. Yet each manor was a part of some feudal
domain and in the jurisdiction of some lord, from the king down. These
various interlocking tenures provided at least three basic needs: a stand-
ing army for the new military occupation, revenues in the form of agrarian
produce, and various special services according to the rank or wealth of
the lord and tenant.
As an incident of property tenure, every lord, particularly every chief
lord, including of course the king, had a right to hold a court, and at their
sessions his tenants were obliged to attend, as "suitors." There, matters
of tenure and service were adjudicated, regulations made, civil disputes
settled, fines and other revenues collected. Since nearly all rights and
duties connected with feudalism were inextricably interwoven with the
fabric of the land law, the entire system of government, central and local,
was part of the law of property. What today we might call public law or
public rights were then seen as private rights - even the holding of an
office was viewed as an individual property right. Thus, in the Norman
and succeeding periods the land law was the basis of all public law.
24
At one time in England, prior to the early 13th century, there was little
"common law" in any modern sense. Instead, the law was customary -
the custom of particular lands held by some tenure of some other person
or persons. The face of England was covered with a network of intermin-
gling feudal jurisdictions whose courts applied widely differing aspects
of local customary law. In the court of each lord, which was appendant
to each fief, it was the task of his "suitors" to "find" the applicable cus-
tomary law and to enforce it: the suitors were not jurymen, they were
"doomsmen" or judges. In the still surviving Germanic tradition "law"
was thought of as a folk-way, it was not "made" but "discovered" by
distilling the living conviction of the community in particular jurisdic-
tions in particular localities.2 5 Law was believed to be immemorial, as
old as the community itself, like the boundary stone or the ancient oak
tree. In reality, however, the "finding" of law and the rendering of a
judgment often involved a decision as to some new procedure, and hence
a displacement of existing custom. Changes were necessary because men
could scarcely have lived by the rigidities, even the absurdities, of much
of the ancient customary law of the clan, the family or the tribe. Yet as
new law invaded customary law, it was not regarded as being changed
but rather as "clarified" or "improved".
Along with the customs of local feudal courts there was the custom of
the king's own feudal court, where matters affecting him and his tenants-
in-chief were decided, where procedures were devised and claims settled.
In his court, the use of techniques for discovery, clarification, and im-
provements in the law had almost limitless possibilities for the making
of new substantive law within the interstices of new procedures.
24 See id. at 538-39.
21 Id. at 22-23.
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In the course of the 12th century it became a chief objective of the
Plantagenet kings, who had succeeded the first Normans, to enlarge and
extend the "custom" of the king's court. They coveted for themselves
control of the new feudal jurisdictions, not only as a means of enhancing
their own power and obtaining a firmer grip on the entire kingdom, but
also for the revenues which poured into the local feudal courts - the
fines, amercements, wardships, marriages, reliefs and other payments
that passed into the hands of lords from their tenants. The plan was a
bold one because it involved invasions of the property rights of court-
holding on the part of feudal lords and hence was violative both of cus-
tomary law and of the feudal contract. As "king's law" was spread through
royal orders and new mechanisms to enforce them, it began to provide
innumerable conveniences not only to the king but to large numbers of
his subjects. However, those innovations benefited primarily the "free-
men" class, those of Norman and French descent, but slowly as the country
became more English with intermarriages, the benefits spread more
widely and were of increasing popularity.2 6 Nonetheless, expansion of
king's law was obviously seriously inconvenient to the feudal lords whose
jurisdictions it displaced.
A chief basis of the power of the first Norman rulers was the preser-
vation of the ancient English tradition of kingship, with its associations
of saintliness and veneration. As the "lord of lords" the king owed much
to his station, to the symbol of the crown on his head. Writers of the 12th
century are full of awe for the majesty of kings and the image of divinity.
The king was also parens patriae, a guarantor of the law with a general
duty to do justice to all his subjects. By further extending the principle
of the "king's peace," originally imported from Normandy as the Duke's
peace, or the "Peace of God, '27 he claimed jurisdiction over crime and
physical wrong-doing throughout England. His position also owed much
to proprietary rights derived from the extent of his own lands and rev-
enues from them, as well as from his inexorable exaction of dues and
services from his tenants-in-chief. The latter, in turn, were expected to
draw upon the resources of their own feudal tenants, from whom they
received stipulated services as well as revenues from the courts the ten-
ants were obligated to attend. It was the jurisdiction of and the revenues
from those courts that the Anglo-Norman kings coveted.
The extension of royal authority, which was the foundation of the com-
mon law, began its direct course in the 12th century. The process was
accelerated by forceful royal orders, new court procedures, and by the
expansion of existing institutions of government and the framing of new
ones. At the same time the king added a growing number of personnel
necessary to man them. Except for the basic rules of land-holding, fiscal
arrangements, and certain court proceedings, classic feudalism was on
the wane, and England was soon to become a semi-bureaucratic state.
2
1 E.g., LEGES HENRICI PRIMI, c. 6, 2a, at 97 (L. Downer trans. 1972).
27 C.H. HASKINS, supra note 19, at 37-39.
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The changes were first apparent in the enlargement of the functions
of the king's court (the curia regis), which was at the heart of royal power.
That court, like those of other feudal lords, was originally made up of the
baronial tenants-in-chief, as well as important ecclesiastics and others
who held directly of the king. Also included were advisors whom the king
chose periodically to summon or invite. In addition, there were his "house-
hold" advisors: his treasurer; his chancellor who could read and write;
together with minor officials and bureaucrats - men in almost constant
attendance - who carried out basic administrative and judicial duties.
Because the latter performed regularly assigned tasks and were always
close to the king, the curia soon took two forms, of which the more im-
portant was the small "inner curia" which had to be available at all times
to perform continuous duties - undifferentiated executive, legislative
and judicial tasks. The all-encompassing large curia, later referred to as
the Council, began to meet only for matters of general or national im-
port.2
8
As the twelfth century progressed into the reign of Henry II (1154-
1189), royal expansionism resulted in large demands for manpower and
even more for specialization. One can see that development in at least
three directions. First, a few of the officials of the small inner curia were
assigned to deal with fiscal matters, and since no system of collection and
audit of accounts was possible without a court, there emerged the Court
of the Exchequer. 29 Second, for judicial business, some officials were di-
rected to follow the king in his peregrinations about the country. These
men stood on a special footing and soon became the principal officials of
the Court of King's Bench.3 0 Third, others were directed to remain at
Westminster and be available continually to hear cases at a "fixed place."
They formed the nucleus of the Court of Common Bench. 31 Those who
manned these offshoots of the curia were the chosen associates of the
king. Justice was delegated to appointees who were becoming trained
administrators, with full powers to act in the place of the king himself
and applying "king's law" as it expanded in the new tribunals. Justice
was thus ceasing to be feudal in the old sense of chief barons, ecclesiastics,
and other suitors meeting to "find" the law and adjudge cases.
In addition to the proliferation of tribunals resulting from differentia-
tion of functions, the Plantagenet kings early hit upon the device of using
non-feudal instrumentalities to help displace the autonomy of feudal lords
in judicial and other matters affecting the interests of the king. One of
the earliest of these instrumentalities was the special commission, con-
sisting of royal appointees sent out into the country, at first on no regular
28 G. ADAMs, THE ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, 344-46 (1912).
- J. JOLLIFFE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 186 (4th
ed. 1961).
30 1 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN xii-xvii (F.W. Maitland ed.
1887).
31 55 SELDEN SOCIETY, 1 SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH UNDER
EDWARD I xxxvii (G. Sayles ed. 1936).
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schedule, but to act for and in place of the king on some assigned judicial
or administrative task. Immediately, these officials availed themselves
of a device which was a revised version of the Norman inquest, and which
was one of the few institutions brought over to England.32 Predecessor of
the sworn jury, it was employed at least as early as the Domesday survey
of 1086, when local men, locally informed, had testified under oath as to
rights in land throughout England.33 In the reign of Henry II, when special
commissions became institutionalized, they evolved in one important di-
rection as the itinerant justices in eyre, who began to ride a regular circuit
in several counties, making inquiries of local men, receiving factual tes-
timony on behalf of the king, and making themselves available for any
royal business that their presence demanded. 34 Acting in loco regis, these
justices were also professionals, skilled in the king's law like those who
manned the Exchequer, the King's Bench, and the Common Bench.
Against the foregoing institutional background, one can perceive the
importance of the methods already referred to by which the twelfth cen-
tury kings, particularly Henry 11 (1154-1189), extended the royal admin-
istrative and judicial authority. Chief among those methods was the
vastly increasing use of royal writs, which were the essential vehicles for
bringing litigation before the king's courts and for changing traditional
customary law into a law that was to become common to the entire realm.
A royal writ, though similar in form, was more powerful and threatening
than any writ which even an important tenant-in-chief could send forth.35
In form, it was usually an order relating to some aspect of litigation.
Multiplying in numbers as time went on, and issued in return for a money
payment, these writs soon provided litigants who were not even the king's
primary tenants with access to judgments that were more speedy than
those available in local feudal courts, judgments that were immediately
enforceable by fine or threat of contempt. Royal centralization resulted
in increasing amounts of litigation, which normally would have origi-
nated in local courts and been decided there, coming before royal justices.36
In addition, regular use of the writs of pone and tolt brought up cases
from the ancient courts of the county and hundred. 37
Several royal writs had a very wide reach, and of these three types
were of particular importance: those which extended the king's jurisdic-
tion into the courts of lesser lords, those which removed cases from a
competing feudal or local jurisdiction, and those which permitted or fa-
cilitated an "appeal" from a lower feudal jurisdiction.38 Most of the early
32 C.H. HASKINS, supra note 19, at ch. 6.
See J. ROUND, FEUDAL ENGLAND 133 (1964).
3 J. JOLLIFFE, supra note 29, at 193-95.
- See e.g., J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 20, at 29.
Particularly through use of the writ of right, the writ of debt, and thepraecipe.
F.W. MAITLAND, EQuITY 319-20 (A. Chaytor & W. Whittaker ed. 1913); see also,
F.W. MAITLAND, FoRms OF AcTION, supra note 4.37See generally 2 F. POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
666-68 (1895).
38 See id. at 62-63, 69-70.
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civil cases concerned land or related to land. If the king were not the
immediate lord, he had, or would allege, some financial interest in the
law suit; but failing that, he could fall back on the principle that, as the
lord of lords, he had supervisory judicial authority over lower feudal
courts.3 9 Where freehold land was concerned, it was early established that
a plaintiff who was not even a direct tenant of the king could prevent
the lord himself from hearing the complaint in his own court until a royal
writ had set the process in motion.40 It is noteworthy that the king's
jurisdiction seems to have been based not on the wrong done to the plain-
tiff, but on disobedience to the king's command which was behind the
entire process of royal expansion.
41
Other writs proved available for what we would probably term "review"
but which, for the lack of understanding of that modem concept in me-
dieval times, was one of deliberate transfer to the king's court for "false
judgment" rather than a genuine appeal. 42 Another and more commonly
used writ was the writ of error, which made its appearance a generation
or so later. This writ would issue after judgment, to supplement or amend
defects and errors of the king's justices. 43 Essentially, it was an order to
specified royal judges to examine the record and either affirm or reverse
a judgment. As a certiorari to bring up the record, the writ also operated
as a supersedeas to stay proceedings on the original judgment. It should
be emphasized that most of these writs involved the use of a record, which
was a primary tool of royal justice and its extension. The greater certainty
of written words backed the power and prestige of the king's orders. The
importance of records and recordation will be discussed below.
Contemporaneously with the expanding use of royal writs was the
introduction of various "assizes" - hearings before one of the special
commissions referred to but responding to writs ordering inquests, later
juries, of local men in the counties to find the truth about some alleged
fact, usually relating to possession of land, and to present the finding to
the king's justices.44 Trial of many such matters would normally have
been in the court of a feudal lord, with the outcome to be decided by wager
of battle, but a litigant could avoid that procedure and put himself on
the "grand assize," which would then inform the king's justices as to who
had the better right.45 Soon came the assizes of "novel disseisin" and of
"mort d'ancestor," ordering a panel of local men to report facts about
recent possession to the king's itinerant justices so as to have restored
39 F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY, supra note 36, at 319-20.
- F.W. MArrLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 18, at 111.
41 F.W. MArTLAND, EQUITY, supra note 36, at 319-20.
42 GLANVILL, THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENG-
LAND 101 [vii, 9] (G. Hall trans. 1983).
43 See examples in J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 20, at 128-29.
"See id. at 130.
45 See generally GLANVILL, supra note 42, at 26-29 [II, 4-7].
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promptly the "recent" and hence more lawful possession of the disseisee.46
The speedy procedure was in marked contrast to the slow and cumbersome
proprietary action known as the writ of right, which determined full rights
in the land, as distinguished from recent possession.47
At this point it should be recalled that early in the Norman period thebulk of the law was regarded as customary, to be "found" and not "made".
Yet, well before the reign of Henry II, the king's orders had begun to
alter ideas about a rigid or customary law as a result of new procedures
initiated by writ which had begun to spread king's law throughout Eng-
land. Glanville's treatise on the Laws of England, written toward the end
of the 12th century, refers to the "laws of the realm" as if the law was
indeed becoming "common." 4 As early as 1201, there are official refer-
ences to the "law and custom of England," and to the "custom of the
realm. ' ' 49 Thus, the law was becoming "common" without ceasing to be
"customary." However, the term "common law" itself does not seem to
have been used as a term of art until the reign of Edward I (1277-1327).-'
By then it may properly be said that the law of England was to a very
large extent the law administered by the king's own courts. If custom
was once a folk-way it had become the way of the folk with power.51
The creation of "new" law in English feudal society was not limited to
the issuance of new writs by the chancellor or periodic royal ordinances.
Maitland has reminded us that in the 12th century "[a] few words written
or but spoken [by Henry II] to his justices might establish a new mode
of procedure,' 52 and thus seem to be the outcome not of some special or
declared ordinance but part of the traditional law.53 In the 12th century,
at least, it is clear that the crown qua crown possessed and exercised a
vast power similar to legislation "that persistently interfered with or
changed the course of procedure or individual rights."54 Yet, a hundred
years later, as Maitland writes, the king's mere word cannot make law.55
Nevertheless the process was not limited to the king's courts. What was
clearly "new" law was constantly being made not only there but in lower
feudal courts, in boroughs, and in the chapters of ecclesiastical founda-
tions.56 Whether termed "ordinances" or "judgments," they set forth rules
4 2 F. POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 145-48 (1895).The thoughtful suggestion that the assize may have originated with the advisers
of Henry II, from Sicily and hence Islamic law, is explored by Makdisi, An Inquiryinto Islamic Influences during the Formative Period of the Common Law, in Is-
LAMic LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 135 (N. Heer ed. 1990).
412 F. POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 47-52.
48 GLANVILL, supra note 42, at Prologue 1-3.4 9 E.g., 62 SELDEN SOCIETY, INTRODUCTION TO THE CURIA REGIS ROLLS, 1199-1230 A.D. 27 (1200 A.D.), 379, 404 (1201 A.D.) (C. Flower ed. 1944).See Hellis v. Sandwich, reprinted in 29 SELDEN SOCIETY, 3 THE EYRE OF KENT
43 (W. Bolland ed. 1913).
J. GOEBEL, JR., FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR 231 n.80 (1976).
' 1 F. POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, supra note 46, at 136.
SId.
J' . GOEBEL, JR., supra note 20, at 154.
562 F. POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, supra note 46, at 181.Extensive references to sources may be found in J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note
20, at 155-57.
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that were more than statements of prior custom. They were not merely
"improvements," they were genuine changes which were prospectively
valid.
The principal writs earlier referred to, and the machinery of the new
courts for effectuating their purpose, provided procedures that seemed to
have few bounds. However, as the 13th century progressed, objections to
the creation of new writs and extensions of the ambit of old ones began
to be heard. King John had been ignoring accepted procedures and abus-
ing the use of available writs such as the praecipe7 The chief barons of
the realm, prompted in part by their success in obtaining Magna Carta
in 1215 and in running the government during the minority of Henry
III, thereafter sought continued and more enduring power as a reformed
Council. 58 At an earlier time, the king had consulted periodically with
the barons who were his tenants-in-chief on matters of national impor-
tance, but the strength of his royal prerogative seems nevertheless to
have been paramount. By the late 1250's, however, the power of the
magnates had become institutionalized to the point that in the Council
they could insist on a share, through counsel and consent, in the gover-
nance of the kingdom.59 Among their complaints was that the multipli-
cation of new types of writs was becoming an abuse of the law of the
realm and should not be issued by the chancellor at his or at the king's
pleasure.60 Ultimately responding to that complaint was the enactment
of the Statute of Westminster 11 (1285), in which Chapter 24 prohibited
the framing of entirely new writs, unless they were in consimile casu,
that is, of a type similar to those already in use.6 1 Thereafter, proceedings
in the king's courts were threatened by demands for increasing formalism
and inflexibility, and the possibilities of "inconvenience" in the king's
courts began to loom.
The growing powers of the Council, which by the reign of Edward I
included the most outspoken of the baronial tenants-in-chief, as well as
professionals belonging to the small "inner" curia, had four consequences
of importance. First, the writ system ceased to expand rapidly. So closely
were the procedures of "king's law" tied to the writ system, which provided
the warrant for jurisdiction, that redress without writ was impossible -
"no writ, no right." Second, the partial closing of the writ window meant
that the king felt obliged to resort to new devices, such as expanded use
of the prerogative writs of mandamus and quo warranto,62 in order to
17See generally F.W. MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HisTORY, supra note 18, at
93.
" G. SAYLES, THE MEDIEVAL FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLAND 420-21 (2d ed. 1950).
59 G. HASKINS, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT ch. 2
(1948).
W. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 346-47 (2d ed. 1960).
61 STAT. WESTMINSTER II c.24, 13 Edw. I [1285],1 Statutes of the Realm 83,
quoted in J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 20, at 82; 57 SELDEN SOCIETY, 2 SELECT
CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH UNDER EDWARD I lxxxviii (G. Sayles ed.
1938).
62 See J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 20, at 131-32.
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continue his process of consolidation and expansion. Third, the royaljudges, in turn, became adept in the use of the old writs to provide new
remedies in the courts. Fourth, with the emerging needs for remedies to
meet the problems of an expanding commercial society in the 13th cen-
tury, new, more available, and more flexible methods had to be found to
take the place of writs which were not available. One such remedy lay
in informal petitions known as "plaints," first presented to the itineranijustices in the mid-13th century, later to the king, or to his Council, to
complain of a lack of remedy.6 3
These petitions that sought such relief involved questions of property,
franchises, disputes between merchants, a widow's dower, and seemingly
countless wrongs for which no ready or speedy remedy was available in
the regular courts. 64 Often a petitioner complained that justice had been
denied by a royal officer, or that his adversary was too powerful and the
complainant poor. Generally, if a petition had merit, relief was forthcom-
ing.65 So popular did this procedure by bill become, and so great were the
number of petitions presented to the Council, especially in time of par-liament, that a special panel was required to hear and act on them. Indeed,
this function was a primary root of Chancery jurisdiction.66 These prac-
tices ultimately became antecedents of the petitions presented to the
Tudor Council and to its offshoots in the royal prerogative courts such as
the Star Chamber, the Court of Requests and the like, but for the time
being many of the inconveniences of the common law procedures were
being remedied directly by the king in his Council through their officials.
The demands made by baronial tenants-in-chief for assurances that
customary law would be observed were partly responsible for the devel-
opment of written law, as distinct from the recorded judgments of the
regular courts. This type of law, which today we would call legislation,
emerged as a distinct form in the reign of Edward I. With it appeared a
relatively new word - "statute" - which was soon to become a word of
art.6 7 Statutes must be distinguished from temporary ordinances, and
particularly from the recordation of judgments in the king's courts and
tribunals. When portions of established law were first recorded, as in the
case of Magna Carta, such writings were accorded a special status as
confirmations of existing custom, of which they were seen as only a frag-
ment. Thus a tradition developed that the early statutes merely recorded
6 See generally, L. EHRLICH, PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE CROWN 1216-1377(1921).
For the general background of these petitions presented in parliament, seeHaskins, The Petitions of Representatives in the Parliaments of Edward 1, 53 ENG.
HIST. REV. 1 (1938).
See id. at 7.
F.W. MAITLAND, SELECTED ESSAYS 13-28 (H. Hazeltine et al. ed. 1968).
7 G. HASKINS, THE STATUTE OF YORK AND THE INTEREST OF THE COMMONS
39-40 (1935).
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existing law, even when in fact they were innovative.
68 Yet the fact that
the early statutes were in writing, and formally recorded in a special
collection, gave them a validity that marks the threshold or dividing line
between customary law that had special sanction and law that was in-
novative in the modern sense of legislation. 69
Although many of the early statutes were indeed solemn declarations
of old law, more often, as the reign of the first Edward proceeded, they
did in fact create new law, as indicated by the Statutes of Westminster
II, Mortmain, De Donis (the new estate in fee tail) and Quia Emptores
(the "end" of subinfeudation). The hallmark of the new statute was its
permanence, it was "forever," as contrasted with temporary measures or
regulations contained in ordinances.7 Indeed, several of them survive in
the United States today. Their pedigree was royal, but their approval was
commonly stated or deemed to have been with the consent of the Council,
the large curia, which was increasingly referred to as the "community of
the realm."' 71 Moreover, in form they were generally of wider application
than the temporary regulations usually contained in ordinances, which
the king or his Chancellor could still promulgate or rescind.
7 2
Occasionally, a statute was the result of a petition from some group or
groups, the outgrowth of the older practice of petitioning the king or his
itinerant justices for the redress of grievances which had not been or
could not be redressed elsewhere.73 More commonly, statutes reflected
wide consultation, as in the case of those which radically altered aspects
of the land law.74 Sometimes a statute was drafted by royal judges, yet
even in the mid-14th century, it was presumed that the king was the
legislator, not parliament, which by then had become part of the enacting
process.75 There are also indications that at that time it was considered
to be the task of the judges to interpret statutes, to integrate new law
with the old, and to assure that statutes in derogation of established
common law were declared void.
76
** * ***** * ****
T. PLUCKNET, STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF
THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 30 (1980).
19 See generally Richardson & Sayles, The Early Statutes, 50 LAw Q. REV.
201-17, 540-70 (1934).
70 G. HASKINS, supra note 67, at 41-43.
71 Id. at 33-34, 50.
71 17 SELDEN SOCIETY, 1 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II 116 (F.W. Maitland ed.
1903).
71 For a general discussion of the practice, and references to its beginnings,
see Haskins, The Petitions of Representatives in the Parliaments of Edward 1, 53
ENG. HIST. REV. 1 (1983).
74 "Do not gloss the Statute"; stated Hengham, J. "we understand it better than
you do for we made it." Y.B. 33-35 Edw. I, 82, quoted in J. GOEBEL, JR., supra
note 20, at 160-61.
71 See Y.B. 22 Edw. III, Hil fo. 3b, quoted in J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 20, at
160.
71 E.g., G. HASKINS, supra note 67, at 27-28.
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Lest it be thought that throughout the processes described the Norman
and Angevin kings were engaged only in a systematic expropriation of
the rights of their tenants-in-chief and others, five points require em-
phasis. First, the king was believed to have an overriding duty to ad-
minister justice to all. That duty was affirmed in his coronation oath, and
it was enhanced by the uniformity, consistency and certainty with which
the procedures of his law were expected to be applied. Second, the new
procedures, which were developed and made available in the king's courts,
strengthened a belief in their independence, even their sanctity. That
belief was consonant with the medieval ideal that law should be just and
right, for "law" was believed to be primary and sacred, government sec-
ondary.7 7 Third, the new procedures had the appearance of practicality
and reasonableness, especially those which were quietly or unobtrusively
absorbed into custom. Moreover, the processes for invading feudal juris-
diction were selective, that is, in most instances "king's law" accelerated
litigation in feudal courts, or gave new remedies in place of cumbersome
old ones, or provided remedies where none had existed. Thus, the intro-
duction of the assizes of novel disseisin and mort d'ancestor permitted a
litigant speedily to recover ,possession of land. Again, it was the royal
judges who fashioned a new action of battery out of trespass, and who
also devised new writs of dower to protect widows.78 Such actions were
not viewed as arbitrary because they were popular, especially among
those who were not the king's immediate tenants. Law, in the final anal-
ysis, depends for its effectiveness on the acceptance of those to whom it
applies. 79 Fourth, a great deal of manorial jurisdiction was allowed to
remain in the hands of local lords who continued to oversee the enforce-
ment of customary law in their own domains. Fifth, the jurisdiction of
the church courts remained securely entrenched, especially in matters
affecting clerics, unruly behavior, and in matrimonial and testamentary
causes.
That there were excesses on the part of the king is strikingly illustrated
by the events preceding the agreements embodied in Magna Carta, and
by those preceding the Provisions of Oxford in 1258.0 The result of King
John's arbitrary interferences with accepted procedures of due process
had resulted in Magna Carta, which was a detailed formulation of the
jural relationships between the king and his tenants-in-chief. That fa-
mous treaty was not so much a statement of new law as it was an affir-
mation of the "old" law (including many of Henry II's innovations) which
was not being observed. The Charter thus bears witness to the acceptance
77 F. KERN, KINGSHIP AND LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES 153-54 (S. Chrimes trans.
1939).
78 F.W. MAITLAND, FORMS OF ACTION, supra note 4, at 50 (battery), 36-37
(dower).
79 G. HASKINS, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 131
(1948).
o G. SAYLES, supra note 58, at 395-98, 420-27.
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of new customs, as well as restorations of what had become accepted as
"old" law. Of highest importance, is the clear recognition of the rule of
law, to which the entire Charter bears witness."'
One may well inquire how the vast extension of royal judicial ma-
chinery in the 12th and 13th centuries was administered and financed.
No simple answer can be provided, but at least four significant factors
can be identified. First, the king had very large personal revenues from
his own estates and from those tenants-in-chief holding directly under
him. Second, he saw to it that his aides, his counselors, and other officials
were well rewarded for the loyalty of their services, either in money
payments or by grants of land. Third, the king's private revenues were
supplemented by special "gracious aids" approved by the Council and
paid for ultimately by tenants down the feudal scale. Fourth, the use of
the king's process - his writs, his special commissions and his courts -
although available to litigants who sought them, had to be paid for by
those who wished to avail themselves of it, either for the speedier justice
afforded or to avoid the ignominy of losing a trial by battle, ordeal, or
compurgation in a feudal court. Those revenues were vast, and they in-
creased steadily, so that the judicial system not only paid for itself but
brought large profits. Finally, a much-overlooked source of "revenue" was
the labor provided free of charge by local men at the county level at the
direction of the king. This final point deserves elaboration.
As stated earlier, one of the few new institutions introduced from Nor-
mandy was the inquest, which was later to be turned into the sworn
jury.8 2 As time passed, inquests, requiring local knowledge of local men,
were conducted on an ever increasing scale for revenue purposes, for
estimates of costs, for reports on crime, and for facts relating to the
possession of land. Those burdens fell primarily on the class of freehold
tenants and sub-tenants known as knights of the shire. Almost as heavily
they fell also on the burgesses of the towns.8 On these men also devolved
the task of bearing the record of a case before the itinerant justices, or
to one of the central courts at Westminster." By the early 13th century,
these men, although in no sense royal officials, constituted a regular and
frequently used means of communication between the king and the local
communities of England.8 5
"I Haskins, Executive Justice and the Rule of Law, 30 SPECULUM 529, 534-35
(1955); G. SAYLES, supra note 58, at 407-08.
82 C.H. HASKINS, supra note 19 at ch. 6.
- W. STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS (5th ed. 1884); G. HASKINS, supra note 79, at
50.
" G. HASINS, supra note 79, at 50, nn. 11-13.
Id. at 48; G. ADAMS, supra note 28, at 321-22.
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These services were unpaid, and they were rendered at the king's com-
mand. 6 Indeed, they provided an early but rigorous form of compulsory
self-government.87 The expense to the counties and towns who footed the
costs, as well as to the individuals who performed the duties, was ob-
viously great, and the king's insistence on their performance was fre-
quently complained of as an abuse and too burdensome, but to no avail.
If the record was not brought on the appointed day, a fine or penalty
would be exacted from the county or town.88 Nevertheless, they became
an integral part of the system of "king's law," especially through service
on juries, through their fact-finding missions, and through the duty of
bearing the all-important record to designated courts. These compulsory
duties are examples of the inconveniences of the common law, in the sense
that they were onerous insofar as the local freemen and the knights of
the shire were concerned. On the other hand, by aiding the machinery
of law and administration, they were instrumental in extending king's
law and making its conveniences available at the local as well as the
national level.89
The processes of legal development, as distinguished from its course,
are implicit in the preceding discussion, but three of them deserve further
emphasis. First was the continued use of the concept of "custom," which
has been constantly referred to in order to illustrate how "king's law"
infiltrated older procedures and intruded on feudal jurisdictions. Despite
inherited ways of thinking about law as being discovered or found but
not made, from the 12th century on "new" law was constantly made and
introduced either by royal fiat or by writ. Thus, as earlier stated, law
became common without ceasing to be customary. The process was facil-
itated through the expansion of conciliar functions as well as by the
creation of non-feudal institutions. Moreover, new offices, such as those
of the the justices of the peace, were created, and new duties were found
for the older offices of the coroner and the sheriff.90
A second process of legal development was enactment - at first the
affirmation of old law, and then the beginnings of a conscious creation of
new law in the form of the statutes which appeared in the reign of Edward
I and were to become a dominant feature of the maturing legal system.
Roots of a third process have been apparent in the preceding discussion:
the importance of records and recordation throughout the entire judicial
system, slowly leading towards a concept of precedent, which was to
G. HASKINS, supra note 79, at 48-49.
87 Id. at ch.3.
RId. at 51.
9 When the house of commons had "won the initiative" by the early 17th
century, those forced duties had prepared them for self-government in a way not
then apparent in other European countries. Id. at ch. 3.
o See the summary of sources in J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 20, at 57-61.
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become a principal characteristic of the common law down to modern
times. Precedent, unless embodied in immemorial custom, is essentially
dependent on records. In the 12th and 13th centuries, records of a judg-
ment in the king's courts, or of a settlement made there with a record of
the proceedings, had great evidentiary importance because they spoke
authoritatively on the issues involved. Local feudal courts seldom kept
records of judgments, which were usually oral and hence lacked both
certainty and authority. The advantage of a record from the king's court
was that it was official and was backed by the prestige of the king: no
one could traverse the king's record. Moreover, the records were carefully
preserved in collections that have survived till today - in the rolls of
the Exchequer, King's Bench, Common Bench, justices in eyre, coroners'
rolls, etc., and men could turn to them to prove the outcome of earlier
litigation.
Until the time of Edward I, the chief forms of recorded law affected
primarily individual privileges or rights, as in the case of judgments or
local charters.9 1 However, to the extent that judgments contained defi-
nitions of individual rights and privileges as well as pleas, they could
provide "models" and hence help to explain how a judgment had been
reached under early circumstances.9 2 That feature not only gave height-
ened importance to recordation but could provide a root of stare decisis.
Because royal records could speak authoritatively to the reasons by which
a conclusion was reached, the official mind began to cross the line between
res judicata in a decided case and stare decisis as precedent for future
cases. When Year-Book reporting began at the end of the 13th century,
the manuscripts were available to the royal judges, whose search for
precedents grew to become a habit of mind and a mode of thought. Thus,
in 1356, one of the judges stated, "I think you will do as others have done
in the same case, or else we do not know what the law is.''93 In this way,
decided cases became part of the accretions absorbed into the common
law.
By the mid 14th century, the common law had largely won its battles
against feudalism, which in fact, though not in form, was dead. Not only
had the royal courts established that its "conveniences" were protective
of individual rights, but, ironically, the common law had come to subject
the king himself to confining rules of due process which he and his pre-
decessors had helped to create. The "rule of law" had clearly become the
rule of writs. 4
91 H. STEINACKER, JAHRBUCH DES VEREINS FUR LANDESKINDE VON NIEDEROS-
TERREICH 261 (1917).
92 Sources in Fitzneal's Dialogue of the Exchequer, Bracton's De Legibus, and
others can be found in J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 20, at 140-47.
93 Langbridge's Case, Y.B. 18 & 19 Edw. III (Rolls Series) 379, in J. GOEBEL,
JR., supra note 20, at 150 (emphasis added).
42 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 561.
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Weaker kings followed Edward III, and the structure of medieval society
began to break down. The succeeding century and a half was an age of
uncertainty, of conflicting ideals and sentiments, characterized every-
where by deterioration in fundamental values. The central judicature
began to lose its independence, as officials became corrupted and judg-
ments were frequently falsified.95 For a society in which grazing had
supplanted the agriculture of the feudal state, and where the awesome
consequences of the Black Death were still felt, the ancient writs were
cumbersome and their procedures lengthy. Some remedies for growth
were provided by the courts through the use of fictions, as in contracts
made enforceable in an action of trespass by allegations of consideration
where none existed 9 and in the barring of entails by use of the common
recovery.9 7 But those changes had come slowly and, on the whole, were
inadequate. The situation boded ill for the old conception of courts which
defined the rule of law in the face of emerging theories of royal sover-
eignty. To Henry VIII (1509-1547) and later to his daughter, Elizabeth I
(1558-1603), fell the task of restoring civil order and resuscitating the
economy after years of disastrous internal strife. This they achieved with
extraordinary success by ignoring the medieval constitution represented
by the common law and fostering ideals of absolutism which surpassed
anything yet witnessed in English history.98
Throughout England, a deep-rooted conviction had developed that a
strong executive was needed and that the sovereign must therefore have
very broad powers. Not only did Henry VIII, and then Elizabeth, pursue
their ends with a blizzard of statutes affecting the poor, the laboring
classes and uniformity in Church discipline, they sought new courts for
prompt action in the direction of "social" liberty.9 9 Slowly, what may be
called executive justice, administered in newly established prerogative
courts, such as the Star Chamber and the High Commission, began to
take over large areas previously reserved to the common law courts. The
Tudor sovereigns were seen at first to be the benevolent guardians of
social as well as individual interests, and, with their new courts, were
likewise seen as guardians who had power to do freely whatever in their
judgment they or their delegated officers deemed proper or expedient.100
The common law courts were not annihilated but were systematically
side-stepped, as the day-by-day settlement of countless disputes came into
the hands of a newly strengthened Council and its progeny in the royal
prerogative courts. The development of what was later to become arbi-
9 J. JOLLIFFE, supra note 29, at 422; G. HASKINS, supra note 59, at 113.
1 R. POUND, supra note 5, at 168-69 (contract out of trespass and alleged breach
of the peace).
A conveyance by use of a common recovery was a fictitious law suit to convert
a fee tail into a fee simple. There are other examples of fictions, e.g., in ejectment,
conversion - all "collusive" law suits.
Il For a brief summary, see J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 20, at 183-84.
9See id. at 187-89.
100 R. POUND, supra note 5, at 71-73.
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trary power under the Stuarts was regarded complacently at first, for the
newly established courts offered an alternative to, even a means of escape
from, the confining bounds of the conformity inherent in the old proce-
dures.
The story of the ultimate clash under the Stuarts between the common
law and law as decreed by the king is a familiar one, with Lord Coke
battling for the rule of law, and King James for the absolutist personal
rule that he envisaged for the monarchy. A significant aspect of the battle
thus became one between the ancient common law and the law of the
royal prerogative - the rule of law in the common law courts versus
executive justice applied by the king personally or by officials in his new
courts.1 01 The common law judges' objections to the prerogative courts
were not to the prerogative as such, for within their proper sphere the
king's prerogative rights were not challenged, and there still remained
in the king - qua king -a residuum of royal power which no one argued
could be taken from him. 10 2 Their complaint was against the procedures
in the new courts, which ignored ancient principles that had been built
into the structure of the common law.
10 3
However, James I, the first Stuart king, insisted that "kings were the
authors and makers of the Lawes, and not the Lawes of the kings."'
0 4
Since the rule of law had come to stand for protection of the rights of
individuals, that concept was now brought to the fore in order to curb
the pretensions of unbridled royal sovereignty and to protect ancient and
established procedures in which ideas of due process - notice, hearing
and written record - were deeply entrenched.100 In short, judges like Sir
Edward Coke were not only bent on preventing, or at least diminishing,
incursions into their established positions as guardians of the common
law, its certainty and stability, but on restricting the exaggerated claims
of new prerogative rights by the crown. Had not the judges' views ulti-
mately prevailed, and had not they and numerous lawyers joined to sup-
port parliament which had turned against the King,106 the common law
would have lost much of its pre-eminence to the claims of the prerogative
courts in their efforts to carry out the evolving political theory of royal
absolutism.
In order to counter the theory of the growing absolutist monarchy, resort
was had to the existence of the "ancient constitution," which was a logical
extension of the antiquity of the common law, for, so the argument went,
the precedents and principles of that law were safeguarded both from the
king's arbitrary acts and from the reach of the royal prerogative. 10 7 The
'o The initial stages are to be found in the Tudor period. K. PICKTHORN, EARLY
TUDOR GOVERNMENT-HENRY VII 43 (1967). On the general problem in English
history, see G. Haskins, Executive Justice and the Rule of Law, 30 SPECULUM 529
(1955).
102 Jentleman's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 11a, 77 Eng. Rep. 269 (K.B. 16-).
103 See K. PICKTHORN, supra note 101, at 43.
-o4 THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES 1 62 (C. McIlwain ed. 1965).
I- Prohibitions Del Roy, 12 Co. Rep. 63, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (K.B. 1610).
106 Bates' Case, 2 Howell's State Trials 371 (1606).
107 Case of Proclamations, 12 Co. Rep. 74, 77 Eng. Rep. 1352 (K.B. 1611).
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search for the antiquity of the constitution in the common law, as proof
that the legacy of the past still existed and belonged to the present, was
not merely an antiquarian search on the part of lawyers, judges and
respected public men in parliament.10o It was believed that if an ancient
precedent could be found, it was not merely authority in itself but that
the law of which it was a part was equally as old and still in force. Thus
it was believed that a remote precedent connoted immemorial antiquity
for an assured and established constitution. 0 9
That the common law, though antagonized politically by the crown, did
not lose its inherent dominance was in large measure the result of the
career and especially the written works of Coke. Of him Sir William
Holdsworth has written:
His literary work gave a form to its doctrines which was at
once positive, intelligible, and modern. His political career gave
it a political theory, by identifying its doctrines upon matters
of public law with the views of the [anti-royal] parliamentary
opposition. Thus to him it is chiefly due that the victory of the
Parliament meant the victory of a modernized common law,
competent to guide the activities of a modern state. 110
When Lord Coke died in 1634, it appeared for a time that his efforts had
been of no avail, but after the long Civil War and the Restoration in 1660,
the common law system returned, invigorated by his now highly praised
works."'
In another direction, one of Coke's most important contributions was
the respect, and almost reverence, in which his writings were held by
English colonists who emigrated beyond the seas. To them his works
portrayed ancient concepts of fundamental law and constitutionalism in
terms of property rights and associated guarantees which were not only
congenial to their thinking but which would be vital in pressing the crown
to recognize the colonists as having rights equal to those of Englishmen.112
That influence was not only vital to pre-Revolutionary thought, exhibited
in political tracts in the colonies, but helped to establish the English
common law and its conveniences in America.' l
"o' See the summary in J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 20, at 241-42.09 This position is implicit in the arguments and citations in the decisions
referred to in notes 105-107, supra.
110 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 422-23 (2d ed. 1945).
" Id. at 493; G. Haskins, The English Puritan Revolution and its Effects on
the Rule of Law in the American Colonies, 54 TIJDSCHRIFT vOOR RECHTSGESCHIE-
DENIS (1986).
112 See J. REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 276(1987).
"13 See the draft list of common law rights prepared for presentation to the
Continental Congress in 1774 and the final Resolution, printed in J. GOEBEL, JR.,
supra note 20 at 297-98.
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